

Message Text

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10

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 OES-03 FEA-01 NRC-05

NSCE-00 /099 W

----- 086882

O R 280920Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3270

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

ERDA/GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 3938

EO: 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: NPT REVCON: SECURITY OF NNWS

REF: A. GENEVA 3876 B. STATE 121295

1. SOVIET DELOFF (ISRAELYAN), WHO HAD RECEIVED WESTERN DRAFT SECTION OF FINAL CONFERENCE DECLARATION DEALING WITH SECURITY OF
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NNWS (REFTEL A) EVENING OF MAY 26 PROVIDED US AND UK DELS WITH

INITIAL SOVIET REACTION TO TEXT MAY 27. HE SAID DRAFT CONTAINED SEVERAL "NEW IDEAS," SOME OF WHICH SEEMED UNACCEPTABLE. IN LIGHT OF NOVEL CHARACTER OF SOME FORMULATIONS, TEXT WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY IN MOSCOW, AND HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED DECISIONS COULD BE MADE ON NEW FORMULATIONS BEFORE CLOSE OF REVCON. HE SAID SOV DEL PREFERRED TO LIMIT TREATMENT OF NNWS SECURITY ISSUE TO REAFFIRMATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255.

2. SPECIFICALLY, ISRAELYAN SAID SOVIET DEL COULD SUPPORT FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA ONE OF TEXT, PARA TWO, PARA THREE, FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA FOUR, AND PARA SIX. SECOND SENTENCE PARA ONE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED CLOSELY. REMAINDER OF PARA FOUR GAVE THEM SERIOUS PROBLEMS, BUT HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. ON PARA FIVE, HE PREFERRED FORMULATION IN 1972 SOVIET UNGA RESOLUTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AND INDICATED THAT ANY DEPARTURE FROM LANGUAGE OF 1972 RES WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR MOSCOW TO ACCEPT, ESPECIALLY AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE.

3. UK DELOFF (EDMUNDS) MADE PLEA FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, EXPRESSING VIEW THAT TEXT COULD BE BASIS OF COMPROMISE THAT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO NNWS CONCERNS WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY NEW COMMITMENTS FROM DEPOSITARIES. US DELOFF INDICATED THAT US STILL HAD PROBLEMS WITH SOVIET NON-USE OF FORCE FORMULATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT PARA FIVE OF TEXT WAS MORE NEUTRAL FORMULATION, SINCE IT WAS BASED ON UN CHARTER, WHICH ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTED. BOTH DELOFFS EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO PARA FIVE BY JAPANESE. ISRAELYAN SAID HE WOULD REFER TEXT TO MOSCOW.

4. LATER IN DAY JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NISIBORI) MADE STRONG PITCH TO SOVIETS ON IMPORTANCE OF PARA FIVE LANGUAGE TO PROSPECTS FOR DIET RATIFICATION ON NPT. SOVIETS WERE NON-COMMITTAL, REFERRING AGAIN TO 1972 UNGA RES AND SIMPLY PROMISING TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE. SOVS DID, HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT JAPANESE EMBASSY MAKE APPROACH IN MOSCOW.

5. AT MEETING OF NATO GROUP PLUS JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, CANADIAN DELOFF STATED THAT, SINCE DRAFTING COMMITTEE WOULD PROBABLY GET AROUND TO WORKING ON LANGUAGE OF NNWS SECURITY SECTION ON MAY 28, IT WAS ADVISABLE TO HAVE GROUP'S TEXT ON TABLE. HE THEREFORE OFFERED, AND GROUP AGREED, TO HAVE CANADA INTRODUCE TEXT ON MAY 28.

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US DEL INDICATED WE WERE NOT PREPARED AT THIS STAGE TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES FORMALLY WITH TEXT.

6. CANADA SUGGESTED, AND GROUP AGREED, THAT TEXT BE INTRODUCED WITH FORMULATION IN FIRST SET OF BRACKETS IN PARA FOUR. CANADIAN DELOFF FELT STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THAT DRAFTING CHANGE WAS NEEDED TO CLEAR UP AMBIGUITY THAT BOTHERED NUMBER OF DELS THAT HAD BEEN CONSULTED ON TEXT. THEY WERE TROUBLED BY WORD "CONCERNING" IN

FORMULATION (WHICH DEL WAS AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT IN REF B) "TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO UNDERTAKING AN OBLIGATION CONCERNING THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. . ." IT WAS FELT THAT, UNDER THIS FORMULATION, NWS COULD CONSIDER UNDERTAKING OBLIGATION ACTUALLY TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NFZ PARTIES. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF GROUP SUPPORTED IDEA OF ELIMINATING AMBIGUITY.

7. WE POINTED OUT THAT IRANIAN FORMULATION (I.E., NEVER TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE) WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR QUALIFIED UNDERTAKING IN PROTOCOL II OF TREATY OF TLAHELCO AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT LANGUAGE IN PARA FOUR PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN DEVISING FORMULA FOR ANY POSSIBLE UNDERTAKING. AFTER DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF GROUP SUPPORTED THE FOLLOWING: ". . . AND URGES THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO PROVIDING NEGATIVE ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST STATES WHICH HAVE BECOME PARTIES. . ."

8. US DEL URGED STRONGLY THAT GROUP ADHERE TO ORIGINAL FORMULATION. BOTH CANADIANS AND AUSTRALIANS, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ABOUT TABLING VERSION WITH "LOOPHOLE" IN IT, AND URGED US TO ACCEPT RE-FORMULATION. CANADIANS AGREED TO HOLD OFF ON TABLING AS LONG AS THAT WAS TACTICALLY POSSIBLE, BUT GAVE CLEAR INDICATION THEY WOULD GO AHEAD, WITH OR WITHOUT US SUPPORT, WITH NEW FORMULATION WHEN WORK IN DRAFTING COMMITTEE REACHED POINT WHERE THAT BECAME NECESSARY (ALMOST CERTAINLY MORNING OF MAY 28).

9. GUIDANCE REQUESTED: US DEL REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TO SUPPORT REFORMULATION IN PARA 7 ABOVE. NEW LANGUAGE, WHILE ELIMINATING "LOOPHOLE" THAT BOTHERED SOME DELS, SEEMS TO PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE FOR QUALIFYING, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, ANY SUCH UNDERTAKING. IN ANY EVENT, THIS FORMULATION (LIKE FORMULATION DEL
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EARLIER AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT) SIMPLY CALLS ON NWS "TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION" TO PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO PARTIES TO "SUCH" REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (I.E., THOSE ESTABLISHED UNDER EFFECTIVE CONDITIONS AND ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS).DALE

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